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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(3)0, 
accordingly the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on December 8,1998, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County to the Utah Supreme Court. By letter dated 
April 13,1999, the Supreme Court poured-over authority in this case to the Court of 
Appeals for disposition. See Utah Code Ann. §78. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. The trial court erred in finding that specific personal jurisdiction existed in this 
case and that the defendant was subject to the long arm of the Utah courts 
and the trial court should have dismissed the case. 
II. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because the plaintiff was not 
the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17 U.R.C.P. nor was it a proper 
party pursuant to §78-33-2 Utah Code Ann. and the trial court should have 
dismissed the case. 
III. The trial court erred in mechanically adopting the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prepared and presented by counsel for the plaintiff. 
IV. The trial court's findings of facts are insufficient to support its conclusions of 
law and therefore its rulings are a nullity. The trial court further erred in 
ignoring and failing to rule upon this issue when it was raised by defendant in 
its U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) motion. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING 
AUTHORITY 
In jurisdictional matters, this Court, "grant(s) no deference to the conclusions 
of the trial court." Ross v. Schackel, 920 P. 2d 1159,1162 (Utah 1996). SII 
Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp. 969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998). 
"An appeal from decision that presents only legal questions . . . reviewed for 
correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P. 2d 1120, 
1121 (Utah 1992); Stairways v, Curry, UTDk 980025 (Utah 1999). Further, in 
cases involving review of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. where the issue is jurisdictional, 
the standard of review is de novo, "if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment 
cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs." 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P. 2d 768,771 (Utah App. 1997); Lund v. Hall, 
938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved on appeal in both of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with accompanying memoranda (I. 31-206 
and I. 249-91). 
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to 
determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed." Thompson v. 
Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230,1232 (Utah App. 1987). If a court acts beyond its 
authority those acts are null and void. . . When a matter is outside the court's 
jurisdiction it retains authority only to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. 
v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). Rule 17(a) "contemplates 
that the party bringing the suit has the capacity to sue, otherwise the suit is a 
nullity." Estate of Martin Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah App. 1994). 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'We independently determine whether the appeal is proper when reviewing a 
jurisdictional issue." Alfred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah App. 1992). 
Further, in cases involving review of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. where the issue is 
jurisdictional, the standard of review is de novo, "if jurisdiction is lacking, the 
judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom 
it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, becomes 
a question of law upon which we do not defer to the trial court." Bonneville 
Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768,771 (Utah App. 1997); "We accord no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law but review them for 
correctness." Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997). This issue was 
preserved on appeal in both of Defendant" s Motion to Dismiss with 
accompanying memoranda (I. 31-206 and I. 249-91)1. 
III. "Utah's appellate courts look to the record and will affirm the findings if there 
is 'no indication from the record . . . that the trial judge failed to adequately 
deliberate and consider the merits of the case. Automatic Control Products Corp. 
v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780 P.2d 1258,1260. Findings of fact prepared by the court 
"are drawn with the insight of a disinterested min" and are "more helpful to 
the appellate court" than those prepared by counsel. United States v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964). It is for this reason that the federal 
courts appear to have almost uniformly adopted the rule that while findings 
1
 In addition, plaintiff notes in its Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motions 
for Relief from Judgment or Order that defendant has raised this issue 11 times 
before the trial court. (See footnote 6). (I. 597-617) 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prepared by counsel are sufficient under the federal analogue to U.R.C.P. 52, 
appellate courts 'Svill feel freer in close cases to disregard a finding or remand 
for further findings if the trial court did not prepare them him [or her] self." 9 
Wright & Miller, at 707. See also, Ramsey Construction Co. v. Apache Tribe of 
Mescalero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980) Automatic Controls page 
1264. This issue was not raised with the trial court because it did not become 
relevant until after the trial court made its rulings. Defendant did file two post 
trial Motions for Relief from the trial courfs Order, one claimed newly 
discovered evidence and the other raised parts of this issue, e.g. that the trial 
court had extended its order to cover Maryland even though Maryland law had 
not been briefed for the court. The trial court ruled on the first post trial 
motion, denying it, and ignored the second completely. 
"It has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be 
predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact and that the judgment 
or decree must follow the conclusions of law." Gillmorv. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 
436 (Utah 1993). "Because a summary judgment resolves only questions of 
law, we give no deference to the trial court* s determinations. We affirm only 
if the decision before us was correct." Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 844 
P.2d 949,958 (Utah 1992). As stated previously this issue was preserved in 
the defendanf s Rule 60(b)(1) motion which was ignored by the trial court. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment 
Section. 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Rule 17(a). Parties plaintiff and defendant. U.R.C.P. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express 
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit 
of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without 
joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so 
provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of 
the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution 
shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-33-2 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose rights, status 
or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or 
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under 
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relation thereunder. 
Utah Code Ann, §78-51-32. Authority of attorneys and counselors. 
An attorney and counselor has authority: 
(1) to execute in the name of his client a bond or other written instrument 
necessary and proper for the prosecution of an action or proceeding about to 
be or already commenced, or for the prosecution or defense of any right 
growing out of an action, proceeding or final judgment rendered therein. 
(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an action or proceeding by his 
agreement filed with the clerk or entered upon the minutes of the court, and 
not otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-51-33. Proof of authority for appearance. 
The court may on motion of either party and on the showing of reasonable grounds 
therefor require the attorney for the adverse party, or for any one of several adverse 
parties, to produce or prove by his own oath or otherwise the authority under 
which he appears, and until he does so may stay all proceedings by him on behalf of 
the parties for whom he assumes to appear. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
David Melvin, a legal resident of the State of Maryland and a citizen of the 
United Kingdom, the appellant/defendant (hereinafter defendant) was employed by 
the Franklin Covey Company, Inc. (FCQ from January, 1992, until September 12, 
1997. (Federal court filing, Response to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss— Index - hereinafter I. - 31-206)2. FCC. terminated the defendant in 
August, 1997, effective as of September 12,1997. Subsequendy, the defendant sent a 
demand letter to the FCC. which was received by that company on February 8,1998. 
(1.1-13). FCC never responded to that demand letter. Instead, plaintiff Franklin 
Covey Client Sales, Inc. (FCCS) filed its complaint in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah seeking Declaratory Relief on February 13th . (I. 1-13). 
The defendant" s first notice of this action was by service of a summons upon him at 
his home in Silver Spring, Maryland on February 14th . (I. 14-15; I. 207-210). The 
Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to U.S District Court, State of Utah on March 
9th and the plaintiff filed a Motion for Remand on March 17th .3 (I. 31-206). 
Subsequently, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 24,1998, alleging lack 
2
 All references to the record, pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, are made based upon the Court of Appeal Index which was faxed to the 
appellant by the Clerk of this Court, since Appellant has no access to the original 
documentation in Utah. 
3
 Throughout this entire period defendant was pro se until Maryland counsel was 
admitted Pro Hac Vice on October 30,1998. 
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of personal jurisdiction and the fact that the plaintiff was not a proper party pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. 17(a). (I. 31-206). On April 10,1998, plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or to Change Venue on April 13, 
1998. (L 31-206). On May 13,1998 an Order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Remand 
was filed by Judge Dee V. Benson, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, 
Central Division. (I. 31-206). 
Plaintiff then filed a Notice to Submit for Decision or Hearing on May 19th . 
(I. 211-216). Defendant filed his Opposition to Summary Judgment on May 29th (I. 
224-43) and plaintiff filed its Reply on June 9th . (I. 295-305). In June, 1998, venue 
was changed from U.S.D.C. to Utah 3rd District Court. (I. 244-7). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss before Judge Young, Third Judicial 
District Court, on June 3rd alleging, as it had in its previous motion, that the court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that the plaintiff was not a real 
party at interest nor did privity exist between the parties. It further alleged that 
Declaratory Relief was inappropriate, as material issues were in dispute and requested 
postponement of any hearing until after discovery. (I. 249-91). On June 9th, plaintiff 
filed a document entitled "Franklin Covey Co. Consent to be Bound," signed by 
plaintiffs counsel (but unsigned by any FCC representative), which purported to be 
an assignment of FCC s rights to pursue this matter to FCCS. (I. 292-4). Further, on 
June 9th, Plaintiff sent defendant a Notice of Hearing scheduling a hearing for Friday, 
June 19th in Judge Young's courtroom. (I. 306-7). On June 10th, defendant filed a 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion to Continue the Hearing Date informing the court that he resided in 
Maryland, that said date chosen unilaterally by plaintiffs counsel conflicted with prior 
work commitments of the defendant, and requested, pursuant to Rule 4-501(5), Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration to participate by telephone. (I. 327-30)4. By letter 
dated June 15th, to plaintiffs counsel, defendant reviewed these issues and the 
fundamental unfairness pertaining thereto as well suggesting that the hearing be 
continued until after the completion of discovery. (I. 320-3). On June 15th plaintiff 
filed an Amended Notice of Hearing, scheduling a hearing for Friday, June 26th in 
Utah. (I. 314-6). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the second Motion to Dismiss on 
June 16th. (I. 317-9). Defendant filed his response to the Motion to Strike on June 
23rd . (I. 371-5). On June 23rd, plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision (I. 357-
9) as well as a Request for a Consolidated Hearing. (I. 354-6). On June 23rd, 
defendant filed a Motion to Stay, noting that a decision could be rendered without a 
hearing — since only the defendant had filed sworn affidavits which were unanswered 
by plaintiff (who had chosen to rely on misstating the contents of defendant's 
affidavits, rather than file any sworn affidavits supporting its contentions), with the 
remaining evidence before the court documentary. The defendant requested that the 
court choose to rule without holding a hearing (if his request for postponement was 
denied), noting (a) the hardships posed by his attendance at a hearing in Utah; (b) that 
4
 Unlike any other court in which counsel has practiced, the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not place any requirements on the district court to notify the parties of 
rulings made and/or filed. Defendan t ,^ se and residing 2000 miles from the 
courthouse, was placed under a constant disadvantage in terms of finding out 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plaintiff had waived its right to a hearing though lack of compliance with Rule 4-
501(b)(3) Utah Code of Judicial Administration requiring that a hearing request be 
filed with a part /s principal memorandum; (c) the lack of any communication with 
the defendant by the court; (d) the irreparable harm that would be caused by 
requiring the defendant to defend himself at a hearing over 2000 miles from his 
home, on short notice without adequate time to prepare; and, (e) reiterating 
defendant's request to participate by telephone. (I. 360-70). 
Judge Young failed to rule on any of these motions. Instead on June 26th, a 
hearing was held in Utah before Judge Young without the presence of the defendant, 
(while plaintiffs counsel was present he presented no evidence nor called any 
witnesses) in which, unsurprisingly (based on these facts), Judge Young granted both 
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Declaratory Judgment. On 
July 9th the Index reflects that an Order was filed (I. 392). As Defendant never 
received a copy of this Order, its contents are unknown. On July 14th, defendant filed 
Objections to plaintiff s proposed Order. (I. 395-7). On July 14th the Order granting 
Summary Judgment was signed. (I. 393-394). (The Order granting Summary 
Judgment has a written notation "7/14/98, objections denied.") On July 21s t, 
defendant filed objections to plaintiff s proposed Order regarding Declaratory 
Judgment. (I. 398-402). On July 27th the Order granting Declaratory Judgment was 
filed. (Defendant's objections were never ruled upon.) (I. 410-412). On July 27th and 
again on the 29th, Defendant filed Motions for Extension of Time, requesting 
information on the status of the case. Phone calls were not returned and requests for 
10 
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additional time to file Motions for Reconsideration due to newly discovered evidence. 
In his motions defendant alleged recent newly discovered evidence which supported 
his contention that FCCS was not the real party in interest. "Unfortunately, the 
person who possesses this information is currently outside of the continental U.S. 
and will not return until late July," thus necessitating a short delay (I. 413-9). Judge 
Young never responded to these motions, although the record indicates that an 
unsigned Order was filed on August 10th . (I. 420-23). (Defendant never received a 
copy of the Order nor is he aware of its contents.) 
Defendant did not learn of the entry of the Declaratory Judgment Order until 
August 28th. The pertinent facts were contained in an affidavit submitted as an 
attachment to defendant's Motion for Extension of Time for Appeal: (I. 426-9) 
a. The pro se defendant in the case of Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. 
David Melvin, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah states under the penalties of perjury that: 
b. I am also the plaintiff in the case of Melvin v. Franklin Covey Co. and 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., filed in the U.S. District Court for 
Maryland, Greenbelt Division, in which I was represented by Mark 
Hessel, Esq. of Maryland. 
c. In late July, 1998,1 informed Mr. Hessel that my family and I would be 
out of the state of Maryland for most of the month of August on 
family and related matters and expressed my concern about keeping 
information were frequently ignored. 
11 
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abreast of the Utah case. We discussed the best way for me to do so, 
and, Mr. Hessel agreed to serve as intermediary during my absence. I 
was present, in Mr. Hessel's office, when he phoned Steven Bednar, 
attorney for the plaintiff, and heard him explain to Mr. Bednar as we 
would be absent from Maryland for most of August, he, Mr. Hessel, 
had agreed to serve as a point of contact for all mail and/or other 
matters related to the Utah case. I then provided Mr. Hessel with a 
contact number where I could be reached and confirmed with Mr. 
Hessel that I would regularly (at least once per day) check our 
Maryland voice mail. 
d. During our absence , my wife and I checked our Maryland voicemail at 
least once per day but received no messages from Mr. Hessel. I also 
called Mr. Hessel's office 2-3 times per week every week. In most 
instances I got his voicemail and left a message. On two occasions I 
spoke with Mr. Hessel. During the first, prior to August 13, Mr. 
Hessel informed me that Mr. Bednar had contacted him about Mr. 
Hessel's status in the Utah case. Mr. Hessel told me he had written a 
letter to Mr. Bednar confirming that he was not representing me in the 
Utah case but simply serving as point of contact for communications 
during August. For the next 2 weeks I left several messages for Mr. 
Hessel but received no return calls. On August 28,1998,1 spoke to 
Mr. Hessel. At that time he informed me that he had "a letter on his 
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desk dated August 13,1998" from Mr. Bednar which he had received 
on August 16,1998. When asked what the letter said, Mr. Hessel 
replied, "I don't know, I haven't read it," and proceeded to read it to 
me.. Mr. Bednar's letter informed me contained the information that 
Judge Young had granted Declaratory Judgment on July 27 th.. When I 
asked Mr. Hessel why he had not informed me of this previously, he 
offered no response or explanation. Subsequent inquiries made to Mr. 
Hessel have been no more productive and he no longer serves as our 
family^ s personal attorney. 
While Mr. Hessel's actions were unfortunate, they were also totally 
unforseeable. 
Upon learning of the existence of Mr. Bednai^s letter and Order, I 
immediately obtained copies from Mr. Hessel the next day. Upon 
receipt I took the following actions: 
I immediately filed a notice of appeal5. 
I wrote to Mr. Bednar explaining the situation." Defendant also 
immediately called plaintiffs counsel, and explained the situation. 
Foolishly, as it turned out, defendant requested that the parties work 
something out so that defendant wasn't prejudiced unfairly. Plaintiff s 
counsel turned down the request for an amicable resolution and chose 
to press the unfortunate circumstances to its full advantage. (See 
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Appellant's Motion to Stay filed with the Utah Supreme Court, 
November 5,1998.) 
Defendant also filed a number of motions with the trial court seeking relief 
from its judgment raising the issues that are raised in this appeal, (I. 502-550), all of 
which were opposed by the plaintiff. (I. 564-96). Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition with the Supreme Court based on the untimely filing of the 
defendant's appeal which was granted on December 9th . 
Judge Young signed an Order admitting defendant's Maryland counsel ProHac 
Vice on October 26th . (I. 628-30). On November 10th Judge Young issued an 
opinion denying all of the defendant's post trial motions. (I. 662-666). The instant 
appeal from that opinion was filed on December 8,1999. (I. 667-76). On January 12, 
1999, plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Disposition which was "deferred/denied" 
by the Utah Supreme Court on February 9th. The Court further stated "(T]he parties 
are asked to include the jurisdictional issue in their briefs." (See Attachment A). On 
April 13th the Utah Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, a resident of Maryland and citizen of the United Kingdom, was an 
employee of Franklin International, Europe, a division of Franklin International 
Institute, Inc. (a predecessor to FCC) in the U.K. as an Account Executive and 
training consultant. He was employed in this capacity from January, 1992, until July, 
1995. As that time he was consistently ranked number one in productivity. (See 
5
 While the Notice of Appeal was mailed to the Clerk of Court the next day, 
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Response Memorandum to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, - hereinafter Response 
Memorandum - Defendant's Attached Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206)6 FCC, 
is an international professional services and leadership development company with 
over 4,200 employees (as of August 31,1998), with total sales of $546,612,000 (again 
as of 08/31/98). FCC is incorporated in Utah where its corporate headquarters are 
located. (Company Annual Report, 1998). FCC maintains 10 regional offices based 
around the globe serving organizations and individuals in more than 30 countries. 
(Company Annual Report, 1998). FCC owns considerable real estate in Utah, and 
maintains sales, administrative and warehouse facilities in or near, Salt Lake City; 
Phoenix; Atlanta; Washington D.C. and, at least 16 locations overseas. (Company 
Annual Report, 1998). 
In 1995, after several years of successful employment with FCC, the 
defendant, for personal reasons, decided to relocate to the state of Maryland and 
applied for an intra company transfer to the Shipley Division of FCC in the U.S. On 
May 31,1995, defendant signed a letter of agreement in Maryland offering him a job 
in the U.S. dated May 9th, signed by John Harding, Senior Vice President, Shipley 
Associates, a division of Franklin Quest (later Franklin Covey) in which he was 
offered a position as an account executive for the Central Atlantic States with Shipley 
Associates, a division of FCC. (See Response Memorandum, Defendanf s Attached 
Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). He began work on July 5,1995. His place of 
inexplicably the appeal was not docketed until September 11,1998. 
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employment, provided by FCC was an office suite located at 200 Orchard Ridge 
Drive, Gaithersburg, Maryland in which 5 other individuals also employed by FCC 
were assigned to sell different FCC products. (See Response Memorandum, 
Defendant's Attached Declaration, I. 31-206). When he commenced employment he 
was given responsibility for sales in the Central Atlantic States in the Eastern Region 
of the U.S. His territory included New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia. As an Account Executive, 
Melvin was responsible for selling a line of FCC s products and services including 
writing and presentation training and consulting services in the Eastern United States 
and Europe. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant" s Attached Declaration, I. 31-
206). At no time was the defendant given responsibility for sales in Utah. (See 
Response Memorandum, Defendant's Attached Declaration, I. 31-206). Further, 
Melvin has never resided in Utah. Has no bank account or other financial ties of any 
kind to Utah. Owns no property in Utah. Pays no taxes in Utah and has no other 
connection to the state other than the fact he was employed by a company that was 
headquartered in Utah for a period of years. During his entire tenure with FCC, 
Melvin made 10 trips almost all consisting of a few days. As listed in his affidavit 9 of 
the 10 trips were at FCCs behest for conferences or trainings he was required to 
attend in order to keep his job.. Of the 10 trips, only 5 are relevant to this proceeding 
as they were the only ones that occurred after Melvin moved to the U.S. and assumed 
6
 For the Courf s convenience both affidavits in this section are included in the 
addendum the Defendant" s Declaration is Attachment B and the Supplemental 
Statement is Attachment C. 
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employment in Maryland. The 10th trip, for one day on May 30,1997, was made at 
the request of FCC for a meeting to be held in Utah, at FCCs insistence, with a 
former client of Melvin's from the U.K., GEC. (GEC is not a Utah company nor 
does it maintain a presence in Utah. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant* s 
Attached Declaration, I. 31-206). "Since I knew GEC from when I worked in the 
U.K., I was asked by Franklin to help its sales staff in Utah understand GEC needs. I 
attended because FCC requested it. I did not receive any compensation for this trip 
(although his only compensation at that time was straight commission - thereby 
depriving Melvin of his ability to earn a livelihood during that period of time.) I did 
not attempt to sell products or services to GEC in Utah and no sale resulted in Utah 
at that time." Melvin never received compensation either for the time he expended or 
his efforts on behalf of FCC. Nor did he receive any commission on any resulting 
sales. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant's Attached Declaration, I. 31-206). 
It is upon this extremely slender thread that the plaintiff attempts to deny that it has 
overreached and to support its claim of specific personal jurisdiction in the Utah. 
FCC sponsored Melvin's application for a work status visa with the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service stating that his job description was as 
a"strategic business communications account/channel manager in the Eastern United 
States and Europe," and the appropriate visas were issued. (See Response 
Memorandum, Attachment D, L 31-206). Melvin worked for the company selling its 
products to customers in his assigned "Eastern Region" in and around Maryland for 
a period of approximately two years when he was summarily fired on March 31,1997. 
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(See Response Memorandum, Attachment A, Dismissal Letter I. 31-206). At no time 
prior to plaintiffs discharge had he received any negative comments about his job 
performance. (See Motion to Dismiss, Attachment A, Letter of Congratulations from 
President and CEO of Franklin Quest. I. 31-206). 
After Melvin was terminated, he approached management and asked them to 
reconsider their decision. He needed the job because his INS Work Visa was only 
valid if he worked for FCC. After a number of conversations and proposals by 
Melvin, FCC agreed to rehire Melvin with a substantially different salary structure 
which was highly detrimental to Melvin and highly beneficial to FCC. (See Response 
Memorandum, Defendant* s Attached Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). One 
element of this contract contained the phrase "according to FCC policy, commissions 
are paid only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin." 
Melvin signed believing, as detailed in his affidavit, 1) that the "services" referred to 
Melvin's services to FCC, and; 2) that, based upon his previous knowledge of other 
former employees with the FCC, this provision would only apply in the case of 
voluntary departure. (See Supplemental Statement; Opposition to Summary 
Judgment I. 224-43). Subsequently, after a period of approximately five and one half 
months, during which Melvin received regular positive feedback about his 
performance (including such comments as one senior manager* s "high regard for 
Melvin" and that Melvin was a "class act,"), and after receiving assurances that he 
"would be made whole" in September, 1997, and complying with requests to perform 
additional (uncompensated) work (partly described above) outside the scope of the 
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letter of agreement or anticipated employment, he was again summarily fired in 
August, 1997 at the airport by phone as he was about to board an airplane for a 
company requested trip to Utah. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant's Attached 
Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). In fact, FCC employees deliberately continued 
to "string Melvin along" with a variety of promises to lull him into believing that it 
would make good on its ultimate process to "make him whole" while continuing to 
take advantage of his talents and services at bargain basement rates. (See Response 
Memorandum, Defendanfs Attached Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). When 
FCC terminated Melvin, it made no offer to compensate him for either work 
completed by him to date, goods or services sold by him to date, or services rendered 
to date that led to additional revenues for the company. In fact, it waffled about the 
date of termination during which time Melvin continued to service FCC clients in 
order to provide continuity of service. No compensation was offered by FCC (or 
ever provided) for this service either. (See Response Memorandum, Supplemental 
Statement, I. 31-206). Melvin applied to his former employer for compensation owed 
him. The only response was from a current FCC employee, who had been given 
Melvin's accounts, and who continually called begging Melvin's assistance (for free) in 
servicing these accounts. When Melvin requested compensation for these requested 
efforts he was turned down. (See Response Memorandum, Supplemental Statement, 
I. 31-206). Finally, Melvin sought legal counsel in Maryland. Prolonged negotiations 
were required just to obtain his personnel file which contained gross inadequacies, 
including a notation that he had "resigned" from the company for "other 
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employment," rather than the truth that he was terminated. . (See Response 
Memorandum, Attached Declaration and Supplemental Statement, I. 31-206; Motion 
to Dismiss, Attachment 1,1. 249-91). Only after threatening litigation was an offer of 
compensation forthcoming however strings were attached. Before FCC would 
release the monies it lawfully owed to Melvin and was withholding, it wanted a release 
signed by Melvin. Melvin rejected the global release provided by FCC, and instead, 
signed a much narrower release, drafted by his Maryland attorney. (See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Attachment C, 31-206). 
This release only released FCC from commissions for sales completed (meaning 
delivered by FCC to the client) before Melvin's termination. It does not cover 
services and products that were also within Melvin's job requirements and for which 
monies are owed to him. Nor does it cover services completed by Melvin before his 
termination, that led to income for FCC after Melvin's termination. While FCC's 
part of the performance bargain may not have been complete, Melvin had completed 
his part of the process and had successfully provided the services that were within his 
job purview. (1.224-43). This release was accepted by FCC who then paid the 
compensation. Subsequently, Melvin, through his Maryland attorney sent a demand 
letter to FCC's general counsel at FCC corporate headquarters in Utah requesting 
compensation for a variety of other compensation not covered by the release or the 
compensation previously paid. The demand letter included a period of time during 
which Melvin would refrain from taking further action in order for Melvin and his 
employer to find a mutually satisfactory solution without resort to litigation. (I. 224-
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43, Attachment B). In response, in less than 1 week from FCCs receipt of this 
letter, Melvin was served with a summons and complaint at his Maryland home on a 
weekend, by FCCS, claiming to be his employer and requesting declaratory judgment 
in Utah. (See Response Memorandum, Supplemental Statement, I. 31-206). Melvin, 
as he has repeatedly made clear to the trial court judge, (See Response Memorandum, 
Attached Declaration, Supplemental Statement, L 31-206; Motion to Dismiss, 
Attachment 1,1. 249-91), had never heard of FCCS, had had no prior contact with 
FCCS, nor knew of any privity that ever existed between them. In response, rather 
than amending its complaint as permitted by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
FCCS filed a dubious document entitled "Consent to be Bound by Judgment and 
Assignment" signed by counsel for FCCS on behalf of FCC (I. 292-92) purporting to 
"assign any rights which may be necessary, (if any) to entide Plaintiff to prosecute 
this action as the real-party-in-interest." The only evidence ever presented by the 
plaintiff to support this contention was a W-2 issued to Melvin by FCCS (for the 
fiscal year 1997). This form was issued in 1998, several months after Melvin had 
been terminated. (I. 597-617, Exhibit D). It is by this additional slender thread that 
FCCS hangs its hopes on establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Only after the trial 
court had issued the Declaratory Judgment Order and defendand had filed a post trial 
motion requesting relief from the Order did the plaintiff for the first time put forth 
the novel argument that the "Consent to be Bound" (though previously offered for 
its probative value) was now "not an actual assignment but merely notice to the court 
that an assignment (which was never entered into evidence) had occurred. (I. 597-
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617). In this same post trial document, plaintiffs counsel, for the first time, entered a 
document actually signed by officers of FCC rather than counsel for the plaintiff, 
neither dated (therefore impossible to tell when actually executed), nor under oath, 
alleging it to be the actual assignment. The employer was not a party to the suit. 
Further, to Melvin's knowledge, counsel for the FCCS has never filed an appearance 
with the trial court in which the said employer acknowledges counsel for FCCS is also 
FCC's counsel, with the right to act on its behalf. [See Utah Code Ann. §78-51-32 
(2)]. In fact Melvin later discovered that in unrelated litigation in California, counsel 
for FCC was maintaining a position in direct contradiction to that maintained by 
counsel for FCCS in the instant case. In his Motion for Post Trial Relief, Melvin 
provided the court with a copy of a pleading in a California case in which FCC was 
the defendant and in which case FCC took a contradictory position before the 
California court than the one taken here. (Memorandum for Relief from Judgment 
or Order, Attachment B, 523-546). This was first brought to the court's attention on 
July 27,1997. (Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time, I. 413-9). Nevertheless, 
FCCS was granted first Summary Judgment on July 14,1998 and later Declaratory 
Judgment on July 27,1998, the Declaratory Judgment purporting to provide relief 
both under Utah and Maryland law. (I. 393-4 and 410-2). The trial Court's findings 
mirror exactly the proposed findings propounded by the plaintiff. (Compare 
Attachments A and B to I. 393-4, and 410-2). For example, the trial court* s Order 
extended its findings to include the State of Maryland even though Maryland case law 
was neither briefed nor argued to the court. However, this extension to the state of 
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Maryland was included in the proposed findings propounded to the trial court by the 
plaintiff which the trial court mechanically adopted. 
In addition, a review of the only transcript regarding this matter indicates that 
the trial court was confused as to the facts and misunderstood and misstated on the 
record Melvins's ties to Utah which formed the basis for its finding that in personam 
jurisdiction existed, stating: 
"The Court: Remind me of the jurisdictional issue. 
Mr. Bednar: Mr. Melvin contends that he is not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Utah. 
The Court: Don't your underlying contracts originate in Utah and are they 
subject to interpretation by Utah courts?" 
Mr. Bednar: The letter agreement that determines his compensation does not 
have a choice of law or venue provision. Our basis for sustaining personal 
jurisdiction is that Mr. Melvin in his complaint in Maryland alleges that he came here 
to Utah, that he conducted business here by attempting to recruit clients and he is 
seeking compensation (sic) that very activity, and that, therefore, specific person 
jurisdiction does exist. But it may be wise to make a ruling on that motion. 
The Court: All right The court finds that there is personal jurisdiction in the 
case." (Transcript I. 686 at page 6). The trial judge having misinterpreted completely 
the defendanfs pleadings, and having been mislead as to the defendanf s actual 
contacts with Utah, inquired no further and agreed to have plaintiffs counsel draft 
Orders for both motions. The legal battle that followed is fully set forth above. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
L Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 
A. Defendant lacked the minimum contacts necessary to support 
jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due 
process. 
B. The facts fail to support a finding that the defendant purposefully 
directed his activities to residents of Utah or that the instant litigation 
arises out of defendant* s contacts to Utah. 
C. Melvin never conducted business in Utah or any other activities that 
would allow him to invoke the protections or benefits of the Utah 
courts. 
D. Melvin's employment contract does not form the basis for plaintiff s 
personal jurisdiction claim as there is no nexus between it and 
defendanf s activities in Utah. 
E. Plaintiff failed to meet its burden to establish personal jurisdiction 
when its general allegations of jurisdiction were countered by 
defendanf s sworn affidavit countering those general allegations and 
plaintiff failed to provide anything more. 
F. On the present facts subjecting the defendant to personal jurisdiction 
in Utah would offend traditional concepts of fair play and substantial 
justice. 
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G. To find Melvin subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts would 
make the litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient for him that he 
would be severely disadvantaged and denied due process. 
H. The remedial purposes of the long arm statute would not be promoted 
by finding that personal jurisdiction exists in the instant case. 
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
A. Plaintiff was not the "real party in interest" pursuant to Rule 17(a) 
U.R.C.P., nor did privity exist between the plaintiff and defendant and 
thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
B. Parents corporations and their subsidiaries are separate and distinct 
legal entities, each with their own bound by their individual obligations 
and benefits. 
C The "Consent to be Bound" was a document of dubious probative 
value, if any, that could not cure plaintiffs defective complaint. 
D. Where the plaintiff s status as "real party in interest" depends upon an 
assignment, plaintiff has the burden of proving its status as an assignee, 
which plaintiff failed to do in this case. 
E. Plaintiff had the further burden of proving that the defendant had 
received adequate legal notice of the assignment which it failed to do. 
F. Plaintiff chose this dubious course of action to maintain its status as 
first in the race to the courthouse and its actions should not be 
condoned by this Court. 
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G. Allowing such actions as those taken by the plaintiff would make it 
possible for a subsidiary of any giant corporation to sue an employee of 
the parent company in a locale inconvenient to the employee, but 
convenient to the subsidiary, on issues related to the employment 
issues between the parent and the employee even though the subsidiary 
has no relationship to the employee. 
III. Mechanical Adoption. 
A. The record supports a finding that the trial court mechanically adopted 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared and presented by 
counsel for the plaintiff, as the courfs Orders exactly mirror those 
submitted by plaintiff. 
B. The court ruled from the bench on suggestion of plaintiff s counsel, 
even though it had demonstrated its lack of knowledge regarding at 
least one of the issues and had been misinformed by plaintiff s counsel, 
and then at plaintiffs counsel's suggestion agreed to his preparation of 
the courf s Orders. 
C. The court signed a ruling that was manifestly incorrect. 
D. There is nothing in the record that indicates the indicia normally 
accepted by this Court diat the trial court adequately, disinterestedly or 
independently considered the merits of the case. 
IV. Insufficient Findings of Fact to Support Conclusions of Law. 
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A. The declarations adjudged by the court in the Declaratory Judgment 
Order are beyond the scope and not supported by the findings of fact 
set forth in the trial court* s Summary Judgment Order. 
B. To allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory 
process violates the basic premises of our judicial system and denies at 
least one side the fair and impartial hearing and adjudication of his 
affairs to which is his right. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. Personal Jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff has previously conceded that defendant* s contacts do not support a 
finding of general personal jurisdiction. Moreover, of the three bases for finding 
specific personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute, plaintiff relies only on the 
allegation that Melvin transacted business in Utah. Its has never argued that Melvin 
contracted to supply goods and services in Utah or that he cause injury within the 
state. (See plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.) Under the 
facts presented in this case, Melvin did not transact business in Utah as defined by 
the long arm statute and lacked sufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction 
under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law. The Supreme 
Court of Utah has recognized that process served pursuant to a long arm statute is 
not valid or effective to subject a non-resident to in personam jurisdiction unless the 
defendant unless the defendant "purposefully established minimum contact with the 
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forum state" and the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there/5 Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791,794 (Utah 1988). 
The Utah Courts have taken the position that if the set of circumstances 
satisfies Fourteenth Amendment due process constitutional muster, and does not 
violate its requirements of "fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to 
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign," Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) or 
"notions of fair play and substantial justice," International Shoe V. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 317 (1945) then the requirements of the long arm statute are also satisfied so 
long as the claims against the nonresident defendant arise from activities enumerated 
in Utah's long arm statute. Kandarv. LaRay Company, 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here the plaintiffs assertion of personal jurisdiction fails on several grounds. 
"Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
resident who has not consented to suit there, this fair warning requirement is satisfied 
if the defendant "purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the 
litigation results from alleged injuries that "arise out of or related to" those activities. 
Burger King Corp. v. Rud^ewic^ Al\ U.S. 462,472 (1985); Accord, Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106,1100 (Utah 1985) (did the defendant purposefully avail 
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws?) 
There is no allegation nor can one be supported that Melvin directed his activities 
to Utah residents. In fact, his contract, specifically engages him to direct his activities to 
clients and potential clients in the Eastern Region of the U.S. On the one occasion 
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that he admits to offering assistance in Utah, his actions were directed by his 
employer FCC to assist its own sales force in Utah and were not intentional actions 
undertaken by the defendant. Further, the client solicited by FCC, not Melvin, in the 
one Utah visit, was not either a Utah nor U.S. firm. Further, regardless of the 
outcome of the GEC visit, Melvin would not have had any recourse to the courts of 
Utah, in fact, he would not have had any legal recourse at all. FCC was the host and 
instigating party. Any contract would have occurred between FCC and GEC. Thus 
plaintiff has alleged nothing to show that defendant either purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of conducting business in Utah or conducting such activities 
that would allow him to invoke the protections and benefits of the Utah courts. 
"The minimum contacts standard is not susceptible of mechanical application 
and, instead, involved an ad hoc analysis of the facts. . . . the number of contacts has 
no talismanic significance but that the quality of the contacts as demonstrating 
purposeful availment is the issue." Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 884 P.2d 
1299,1301 (Utah App. 1994), and cases cited therein. It should be noted that on 
none of the defendant's trips to Utah did he make any sales, receive or place any 
order; or otherwise conduct the activities he was hired to conduct for the Eastern 
region. If the plaintiff s contention is that it can establish in personam jurisdiction in its 
home state by requiring attendance of his employees at meetings and conferences, the 
logical conclusion to this argument would be that an employer could force an 
individual employee to travel 2000 miles to maintain his job and the require him to 
defend himself in local court against a declaratory judgment. By imposing the 
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additional burdens and costs the plaintiff could automatically provide itself with an 
unfair advantage which is exacdy what it is attempting to do. 
"An individual's contract with an out-of-state party cannot alone automatically 
establish sufficient minimum contracts in the other part/ s home forum. Instead the 
prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the 
contract and the parties' actual course of dealing, must be evaluated to determine 
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts." Burger King at 
pages 478-9. Neither contract signed by Melvin was negotiated, drafted or signed by 
Melvin in Utah. See Synergetics, supra; therefore, the existence of the contract does not 
pass the requisite purposeful activity nor minimal contacts. The contract signed by 
Melvin and FCC, which incidentally has no choice of law or venue provision, 
specifically limited his responsibilities to clients in the Eastern Region of the U.S. not 
Utah. (If the defendant had solicited Utah customers even if he had never entered 
the state, plaintiff might prevail), see Neways v. McCauland, 950 P.2d 420 (Utah 1997). 
But he never did and the plaintiff has failed to show that he did. 
"To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the non resident 
defendant must have "minimum contact with the forum state such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. International Shoe at page 316. "These minimum contacts must be 
the basis of plaintiff s claim." Synergistics at page 1110. Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking 
Machine Co., 838 P. 2d 1120,1123 (Utah, 1992). The U.S. Supreme Court has 
suggested two modes for analyzing whether minimum contact are present: the 
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"arising out of" test and the "stream of commerce test" Hansen v. Deckla 357 U.S. 
235,250-4, rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958); see also Arguello, supra and cases 
cited therein. Plaintiff has never advanced the stream of commerce argument nor 
does it apply, leaving the arising out of test. Plaintiffs complaint sought declaratory 
relief in Utah from a demand letter and potential complaint sent to defendant's 
employer for (according to plaintiff) "compensation for potential future sales to 
prospective customers and entitlement to commissions or seminars after the date of 
his resignation (sic)." Plaintiff was asking the Utah court to grant it protection from 
defendant's claims for income due him for his work in the Eastern Region with 
clients located within his region. It should be noted that none of the customers 
listed in the draft complaint are Utah corporations. Specific personal jurisdiction 
"may be asserted . . . only on claims arising out of defendant's forum state activity." 
Newajs, Inc. v. McCausaland, 950 P.2d 420,423 (Utah 1997). Here there is no 
connection between the relief sought and defendant's contacts with Utah. All of the 
actions taken by Melvin regarding the relief he sought took place in and around the 
state of Maryland and were directed at clients and potential clients located there. 
These sales did not "arise out of" any trips he took to Utah, nor do the trips to Utah, 
with the exception of the one day spent consulting for free to FCC personnel for a 
non Utah company, have any reasonable connection to the relief sought. "Generally, 
the more closely related the contacts are to the cause of action for which jurisdiction 
is taken, the fewer contacts are necessary to establish jurisdiction." Rocky Mountain 
Claim Staking v. William, 884 P.2 1299,1301-2 (Utah App. 1994), conversely where the 
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nexus between the contacts and the cause of action is non existent, one allegation 
that defendant once, at his employer's insistence, provided assistance in Utah to Utah 
based sales staff, is hardly sufficient to support the plaintiffs allegation of in personam 
jurisdiction. 
In Roskelley v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307,1310 (Utah 1980), the Court noted, 
'Where jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on allegation of 
jurisdiction in the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically contradicts 
those general allegations." Melvin notes that the plaintiff has intentionally declined to 
support its allegations with any declarations or affidavits. The Roskelly Court had 
before it, as this court does, the mere allegation by the plaintiff in its complaint that 
the defendant "worked and performed services in Utah and solicited customers in the 
State of Utah." The defendant answered this allegation in a sworn affidavit alleging 
material and specific facts that contradicted the allegation of jurisdiction. Absent 
something more from the plaintiff (which was not present in that case or this), the 
court dismissed due to lack of personal jurisdiction. 
The instant case is similar to Bradford, supra in which the court found 
insufficient contacts with the State of Mississippi for a judgment against Utah 
residents. In that case the Mississippi resident initiated the negotiations for sale of 
Utah property, and personally inspected the property in Utah. The contract for sale 
was to be performed entirely in Utah and partial payment was made in Mississippi. 
Similarly, the employment letter signed by Melvin and FCC was executed by Melvin 
in Maryland. The agreement does not indicate which state's courts would have 
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jurisdiction should a conflict arise. Melvin never knowingly, intentionally or 
unintentionally, subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. His activities 
in Utah were of short duration and did not involve the exercise of the duties he was 
hired to perform. He maintained no connections to Utah or continuing relationships 
or obligations to Utah residents, outside of the fact that he was employed by a 
corporation that did business throughout the world but had its home office in Utah. 
The Court in Bradford found that to subject the defendant to in personam 
jurisdiction on the facts would offend "the traditional conception of fair play and 
substantial justice." 763 P.2d at 795. 
Even where a court has found that a defendant had established the necessary 
minimal contact with the forum state, "these contacts may be considered in light of 
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would 
comport with "fair play and substantial justice." Thus courts may appropriately 
evaluate the "burden on the defendant" against "the forum State's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute." "As we have previously noted, jurisdictional rules may not 
be employed in such a way as to make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient 
that a party is unfairly at a severe disadvantage to his opponent" Burger King at page 
478. Accord, Roske/ky, supra. Even if the plaintiff had met its burden in establishing a 
factual foundation for in personam jurisdiction in Utah, which it has not, there is no 
question that requiring the defendant, an individual who was unemployed for a 
significant period of time due to actions of his Utah employer, with no ties, resources 
or contacts in Utah, to defend an action 2000 miles from his home requiring untold 
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expense in obtaining legal assistance, witnesses, travel expenses and all of the related 
costs attendant in defending himself against a multi million dollar, multi national 
corporation with huge resources at its disposal and representation in Maryland, who 
would suffer no hardship from having this case heard in Maryland, effectively denies 
the defendant his right to have his grievance redressed, his day in court and his right 
to due process of law. 
While the instant claim may "arise out of" Melvin' s employment contract, it 
does not arise out of any activities of his in Utah. In Viacom v. Melvin Simon 
Productions, 11A F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y.) the court adopted the same reasoning in a 
case involving the request for a declaratory judgment. Quoting Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp 742-749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd 573 F.2d 
1288 (2nd Cir. 1978), the court stated that the plaintiff (like FCCS) was "merely 
seek[ing] a declaratory judgment that it did not injure the nondomiciliary defendants. 
It is difficult to understand in what way a cause of action for a declaration that 
plaintiff did not injure defendants 'may fairly be said to have arisen' out of 
defendant's transaction of business in the state . . . The remedial purposes of the long 
arm statute would not be promoted by a finding that personal jurisdiction exists here; 
indeed, where no injury to the plaintiff is claimed, it seems more likely that the state 
courts would adhere to . . . " a more restrictive view where the plaintiff claims no 
injury at all from the defendant's business transactions in the state. 774 F. Supp. At 
863. 
V. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
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All of the documents introduced in this case clearly indicated that defendant's 
employment relationship was with FCC not FCCS. In fact, it wasn't until several 
months after he was fired that he received a W-2 form from FCCS thereby learning 
of its identity for the first time. Defendant argued to the trial court that it had no 
evidence before it that FCCS was the "real party in interest" pursuant to Rule 17(a) 
U.R.C.P. and that no privity existed between it and the defendant. Further, that 
corporations and their subsidiaries, unlike corporate divisions, are separate entities 
each with its own rights and obhgations. 'When a corporation sues or is sued in its 
corporate name, the action is by or against the corporation itself as a legal entity." 19 
Am]ur2d§2173. "Generally service of process on a subsidiary is not valid as service 
upon a parent corporation, nor is service on the parent valid as to the subsidiary." 19 
Amjur 2d §2193. In other words, under general principles of corporate law, parents 
and subsidiaries are separate and distinct entities and cannot sue or be sued on behalf 
of each other except in very specialized circumstances. Utah law is in accord. 
"A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, has its own legal identity and 
existence. Common ownership or control does not automatically destroy that 
separate identity. Although in appropriate cases equity may look through the 
corporate shell to its alter ego to prevent fraud or wrongdoing, the general rule still 
applies that corporations are separate legal entities bound by the obhgations as well as 
the benefits." Institutional Laundry v. Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066,1067 
(Utah, 1985), citing Surgical Supply Center v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Dept. of 
Employment Security 223 P. 2d 593, 595 (Utah, 1950). FCC and FCCS are separate legal 
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entities, each bound by its own obligations and benefits. Therefore, it was totally 
inappropriate for FCCS to attempt to obtain judgment against the defendant on 
behalf of FCC without joining FCC. Even more to the point, "|l]n this situation the 
consideration of justice, which so requires is simply that a controlling corporation, 
such as Omnico, should not be permitted to manage and operate a business from 
which it stands to gain whatever profit may be made, have the advantage of the 
efforts of those who serve i t and then use nomenclature of another corporation as a 
facade to insulate it from responsibility for paying for such services/' (emphasis added) 
Chatterly v. Omnico, 485 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah, 1971). The relationship between the 
plaintiff and FCC, that FCCS was a wholly owned subsidiary of FCC was a mystery 
to the defendant when this suit against him was instituted. The defendant only 
learned some time after this suit against him was instituted against him and even then 
all he learned was that FCCS was a wholly owned subsidiary of FCC, not that FCCS 
had any relationship to the defendant. Both letters of agreement signed by the 
defendant were with FCC, FCC was his sponsor with INS. As his personnel file 
supports, all of his written communications were with FCC. 
Whatever the relationship between FCC and FCCS, the fact remains that the 
FCC operated a business which employed the defendant, had the advantage of the 
defendant's efforts on its behalf, and made money from his efforts. It is a misuse of 
the powers of the Utah judicial system to ask it to sanction an attempt by FCCS and 
FCC to evade FCC s legal responsibilities and obligations. "There is no doubt about 
the correctness of the proposition urged by the defendant that a party should not be 
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permitted to use corpontiniis u|- siiiiikn HUIIKN to rngii^e in it now vou see it now you 
don't legerdemain and thus trick or cheat another." Centurian Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 
562 R2d 1252,1253 (Utah, 1977.) This is exactly what the plaintiff, I CCS, and. its 
counsel have attempted l< ilu I'M (In Mini ii»r ul ill. immeiK htute "Franklin 
Covey" (in its pleadings without identifying which corporation it means), it has 
attempted to obscure the legal distinction between the separate legal entities FCCS 
and H X m i ! "i I1 i , vide H (% responsibilities jml deny die defendant his day in 
court. However, this "artful pleading" should not be sanctioned by this Court 
particularly in light of the fact that FCC has now admitted under oath through a 
lawful,, clearly designated representati v e that it and FCCS are separate companies. 
(See Attachment B, defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order, "Verified 
Answer of Franklin Covey Co. filed in the case of Bay v i » * Mipen \ t mrt, 
Orange Coiiii-h, * ;,il 'SI!? ??) 
It should be noted that plaintiff, FCCS, chose both the forum and the parties. 
When privity was raised rather than amending its complaint to include FCC, as 
permitted by ilii" Until Riiii •,, m nn^iniilly attempted 11 t ignore the issue by obfiiscation 
and finally chose to submit a dubious document entided "Consent to be Bound," 
which is notable for its originality but not its probative value "It, as here, pkunhif • 
j i ttus -as ;i renl patty m mleresl depends upon an assignment from the original real 
party in interest, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in addition to the basic 
elements of its case, its status as an assignee." Alpine AsMMiak, hit, /• KPc^K hit,, 8(1' 
990). By its own admission, argued by plaintiff to the 
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court after Declaratory Judgment had been ordered, in its response to defendant's 
Motion for Relief from the Courfs Order, the "Consent to be Bound" "was not an 
actual assignment but merely notice to the court that an assignment" (which had 
never been submitted to the court before it made its Declaratory Judgment ruling) 
"had occurred," thereby leaving the court with no proof on which to base its 
decision. This was not sufficient to meet the plaintiff s burden, see Alpine, supra. In 
accord, Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Sysco Intermountain Food Services, 944 F.2d 911, (10th 
Cir. 1991), "the burden of proving an assignment is upon him who claims 
thereunder." Under this rationale, the court had no evidence of the assignment, 
hence no valid basis on which to rule that the plaintiff was the real party in interest 
and thus, that subject matter jurisdiction existed. 
"Rule 17 seeks to protect the interests of judicial economy and fairness to the 
parties in litigation." Anderson v. Reynolds, 841 P.2d 742, 744 (footnote 3) (Utah App. 
1992). Despite plaintiffs contentions to the contrary, the dubious assignment, 
Attachment F to plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin' s Motion for 
Relief from Judgment or Order, was, as the record clearly reflects, the first time 
defendant had ever seen or had notice of the existence of the said document. This 
purported assignment was undated, thereby providing no clue to when it was signed, 
and not under oath, thereby further undermining any probative value that it might 
have had. 
In response plaintiff cites Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464 (Utah 1962) in 
which the court held that an assignee is the real party in interest. However, in that 
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case, unlike this o n e , a c lose reading suggests 
before it about the assignment, o n which t o base its decision. Plaintiff also attempts 
t o avoid the issue o f not ice b y alleging that not ice was provided b y the 1997 W 2 
(providec defendant ^CNCIUI mmi l l i i i t ln hi wii;. l itnlj iiml lluii dc f cnd im It.id 
notice of the undated assignment which surfaced for the first time in post trial 
motions filed by plaintiff in October, 1998). "The burden of proof and of ultimate 
persuasion of all., the essentials of its cai lse of action > \ as up : n the pla intiff." I hople r 
Finance and Thrift Co. p. Landes, 503 P.2d 4 4 4 , 4 4 5 - 6 (Utah 1972) , including f o o t n o t e 3 , 
"plaintiff has the burden o f proving that the obligor had not ice o f an assignment," see 
Pillbmylm t a »< I )//a «Vi hi \\ M ' H \ I M I I I H I<I , i i \ I T O M I , hank oj W / I i / I , - 1 ! ". 
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 534 P . 2 d 
887(Utah 1975). Since the plaintiff failed t o mee t its burden o f proving that an 
effective a s s ignment hud i « i a m i r d illit\nri;> \{ In pn tsm llii1^ r.isc ,is a rrul p:irf\ \\\ 
interest, and as it further chose not to amend its complaint to include the real party in 
interest, FCC, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should have 
dismissed the case. 
In 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467 (Utah App. 1995) the 
court noted: "Because 4447 Associates would materially benefit from a favorable 
determina t ic *i • :>f its r ights as an ass ignee seeking t o enforce an ass ignment (as FCCS 
w o u l d in this case), it bore the burden o f proving First Security received not ice o f the 
ass ignment." 889 P.2d at I h e court then found that adequate legal n o t i c e had 
not been receiv eel 889 I i / '3 In th z instant case, Judge Young made no 
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finding of fact regarding this issue, unless one considers footnote 2 of the 
Declaratory Judgment order which states, "[H]owever, the Court finds it is immaterial 
whether Melvin was employed by FCCS or FCC. This action concerns only one 
employee, one employer, and one employment relationship." This was news to the 
defendant who knew of the existence of himself as the employee, FCC as his 
employer and his employment relationship with FCC not FCCS. The 4447 court 
went on to state that the standard of review concerning whether or not a party had 
notice of a particular occurrence was a finding of fact, which it would review under 
the clearly erroneous standard, however, determination concerning the effect of 
notice presented a question of law which was reviewed for correctness. 889 P.2d 
471. At a minimum this "finding" by Judge Young does not address whether or not 
defendant received adequate notice, it merely declared the need for notice irrelevant, 
and, it is submitted, is clearly erroneous. Moreover, the effect of the so called notice, 
"the Consent to be Bound" definitely prejudiced the defendant's rights and under the 
standard of review set forth in 4447 Associates^ this Court should declare the action a 
nullity. 
The question remains why the plaintiff chose the course of action it did rather 
than simply amend its complaint. The plaintiffs contention that the result of this 
case would be the same regardless of which company is the defendant's employer is 
untrue. Had the plaintiff acted appropriately and amended its complaint rather than 
create an end run around the Rules of Civil Procedure, he would have lost his favored 
spot in the race to the courthouse and a very different outcome would have likely 
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occurred in the case latter filed by defendant in Ma;!:} la rid \ lsow hile Ji ldge Y on iiig 
studiously failed to address this issue despite the facts and overwhelming case law 
presented to him, it is quite possible that another court would be less accommodat ing 
and more likely to requite -i "Atu It i .UIIUTCIUT in ilir Kiiilcs it I mil Pun nlurc 
Finally, a ruling by this Court on this issue is also of significant importance to 
the administration of justice because of its potential impact on the issues of Rule 
17(a) status, priv it ) and subject mat ter j \ irisdiction as "w ell as those of ji idicial 
economy and fairness to parties in a lawsuit and the limits to which this Court will 
allow their use or abuse. The defendant, an individual w h o is a resident of Maryland, 
served with a summons) purport ing to represent his former employer after the 
defendant sent that employer a demand letter having failed in obtaining relief through 
ui I in in 11 ,il iiirgfjiifiiiiinii,. Iln lifii ilii loni in nii|»loyi • plaintiff are multi national 
corporations with significant resources. Both do business in and would be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Maryland courts. Melvin's ties to Utah are extremely tenuous 
al best. ( kih llifnu(t>li J iu i luinl trjdifip, nil §78 ?7 ,?4i h 1 Itah < ,odi \nn Us finleii 
it has been conceded that this is the only possible provision of §78-27-24 that has any 
applicability) could a trial court allow this case to proceed rather than either requiring 
the plainti ff to amend its :::c mplaint or iis missing it for lack c -f si ibject matter 
jurisdiction. Determining the limits of §78-27-24(1) Utah Code Ann. is an important 
issue for this Court7 s consideration. Otherwise, it would be possible for subsidiary of 
any giant corporation like General M» •(< »r -= < »r I'mir \\ »n»<T t<» <\iv any rmph lyre * )*' i» 
II 
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parent company in any locale where that subsidiary does business no matter how 
lacking or remote the connection is between the subsidiary and the employee, e.g. 
Hughes Aircraft, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors, could sue an 
automotive assembly line worker employed in Detroit by GM over the terms of that 
worker's employment contract with GM and file that suit in the state of Connecticut 
where Hughes does business, although the employee's only contact may have been to 
drive through the state once or twice on his way to some other destination. This 
could hardly be the intent of the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
III. Mechanical Adoption. 
The record supports a finding that the trial court mechanically adopted the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared and presented by counsel for the 
plaintiff7. The trial courf s findings mirror exactly the proposed findings propoimded 
by the plaintiff. The transcript from the hearing made clear that the trial court was 
confused as to Melvin' s ties to Utah. Counsel for the plaintiff incorrectly informed 
the court that Melvin "conducted business here by attempting to recruit clients and 
he is seeking compensation (sic) that very activity, and that, therefore, specific person 
jurisdiction does exist. But it may be wise to make a ruling on that motion." At 
which point the trial court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction, the only 
pronouncement that came from the trial court, and was based on misinformation 
which the court would have discovered if it had merely read defendant's submissions. 
The rest of the alleged findings of fact were the work product of plaintiff s counsel. 
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though Maryland law was not briefed for it nor it is clear it had the jurisdiction to do 
so (The judge thus signing an Order that was manifestly incorrect.) The court also 
iievei .iddrrs11 ill mini Rult I HA) ISSIU , jlilln mj.»h .is ilrtiiuiistotof 1»\ plinnhl'fs amnsi'l, 
defendant raised it at least 11 time. Instead the court adopted in its Declaratory 
Judgment Order the reasoning and wording of plaintiff s counsel, that the argument 
employment relationship." 
There is nothing in the record of this case 'that indicates the indicia normally 
considered the merits of the case. Automactic Control Products, Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780 
P 2d 1 258 ( Utah 1989) ; l •: mdicia in Automactic Control .. . - "Hat the trial judge took 
the case under ad vis en. * • : - r. and later 
requested from both parties proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the 
instant case judge Young, after unaccountably refusing to allow the defendant to 
participate bj telephone in the hearing, announced his ruling from the bench and 
then agreed with plaintiffs counsel's request that he prepare the Orders. Defendant 
was only given notice of these proposed Order because the 1 Itali rules required 
plaintiff s counsel to do so. Otherwise he would have been shut out completely. The 
Boyer Company v. UgneU, 567 P. 2d 1112 (Utah 1977) in which the indicia included the 
fact that w hili llie Imlmuil ,i>knt llinr pin ailing |urt\ indratl tuulm ,^ llic losing 
7
 For this Court* s convenience the plaintiff s proposed Orders have been included in 
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party was permitted to file objections and proposed amendments which were argued 
before the trial court. In the instant case defendant* s objections were ignored by the 
trial court. Accord, Alia Industries, Ltd v. Hurst, 846 P. 2d 1282 (Utah 1993). State v. 
James, 858 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993), the findings were sufficiently detailed to allow 
the appellate court to review the trial courf s decision. The findings is this case are 
meager at best. 
IV. Insufficient Findings of Fact to Support Conclusions of Law. 
The trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to support its conclusions of 
law. The declarations adjudged by the court in the Declaratory Judgment Order are 
beyond the scope of the facts found by the court in the Summary Judgment Order, 
and are not supported by the record. In its Summary Judgment Order the court 
found the following: "The Defendant* s Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED." 
(The only supporting item was a footnote in which the Court stated it found both 
Motions asserting lack of personal jurisdiction unmeritorious) and "[T]here are no 
genuine issues of material fact and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." There were no further findings. Yet in its Declaratory Judgment Order the 
court declared the following: "(1) Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or 
other obligation to pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation 
related to seminars held or future seminars scheduled to be held or products sold 
subsequent to the September 12,1997 effective date of Defendant Melvin's 
separation from Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant Melvin on 
the Addendum as Attachments D and E. 
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November 1 3 199 7 bars all claims relate d to payment of compensation :>t: 
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin; 
and (3) Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of commissions to 
separa ted Account Execut i v e s is not v iola t ive of law " In a footnote, the court held 
found that the "declaratory relief herein is required under both Utah and Maryland 
law." The court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this 
dispute ' W hilr ,iiliiimnll\ \iwmy, lh< fiLmiiifl all tin IIU'III 1 n HI Id dream of and 
more, unfortunately, the court failed to consider the record before it and whether or 
not its findings were support by that record. 
I n fac i„ ilif i ( null < i imimtlnl several e r to is of luw "Huh1 60(bVD provides a 
trial court may relieve a party of a judgment in a case of mistake of law by the trial 
court." Bischelv. Merritt, 90S P.2d J * Kin
 s>p .onclusions of la:u 
f KI/ r- of facts and the judgment 
or decree must follow the conclusions of law. Where there is variance the judgement 
must be corrected to conform to the findings." Gillmor, supra at page 436. 
Except: for one Marj land case cited by the plaintiff in its original 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, which dealt with a 
general legal principle regarding contract interpretation, ti in It i ,t le i^ii iluon, dull un-
disputed by the defendant, neither side briefed nor presented any arguments to the 
trial court citing Maryland law. While the Declaratory Judgment making the court* s 
Order applicable under Maryland law (;iml iliiis picMini.ihlv .Hlciiiphn^ lo totolose 
future action in the Maryland courts), may demonstrate the value of Rule 5(b)(2) 
15 
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U.R.C.P. to a prevailing party (particularly one in a sympathetic forum), this alone 
cannot possibly justify the overreaching that this declaration demonstrates. 
In its response to plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant raised 
the following affirmative defenses: (1) there was no express agreement between the 
parties; (2) the terms of the April 9,1997 letter are ambiguous and thus do not 
preclude an unjust enrichment cause of action; (3) that defendanf s consent to the 
April 9,1997 agreement was produced by duress; (4) that there was a lack of a 
meeting of the minds regarding the April 9,1997 letter thus no agreement was 
formed; (5) that FCCS and/or the real party in interest, Franklin Covey Co. breached 
its implied covenant of good of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court in its 
meager Summary Judgment findings failed to address any of these issues . "Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entided to judgment as a matter of law." Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 
876, 878 (Utah App. 1994). Since the court failed to address any of these legitimate 
issues raised by the defendant in its findings, it is impossible to determine how these 
impacted the findings that were made, or if they were considered at all. In its 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, the defendant had further argued to the court 
that summary judgment was inappropriate at that juncture because there were clear 
factual issues in controversy and that information developed through discovery 
would aid this court in determining what, if any issues, were appropriate for summary 
determination, and what issues should remain for the trier of fact 'When a motion is 
made opposing summary judgment on the ground discovery has not been completed, 
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the coi ir t should grant a cc nt i tin na n e e • :>JI: d e n y the motion for si immarj judgment." 
Auerback v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977). See also American Towers supra at 
page 11 (Utah 1996). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution states that "[N]o person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The overreaching 
iii-iil m i s u s e n ( filir ( , < m r h o f 1 'dill in fins CASV 1»V ihv p l a i n t i f f i n i ts e f f o r t s t o d e n y t h e 
defendant even the appearance of due process cries out for redress. 
1 It is respectfully requested that this Court enter an Order dismissing 
jurisdiction or in the alternative remand 
this matter to the trial court with instructions to enter the appropriate 
judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. 
I is further respectfully requested that this Court enter an Order 
awarding costs and attorney's fees to the defendant or in the alternative 
remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to oiirr (lie 
appropriate ji ldgment for costs and attorney^ s fees. 
For all of the reason stated above, the judgement of the trial court must be 
d i s m i s s e d o r r e m a n d e d Willi in i l i r l m l n mi l Willi MisMurh'»iv< l o v v u i (Ii 
appropriate judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant 
Respectfully submitted, 
Marsha A. Ostrer, Esq. 
47 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NEIL A. KAPLAN, Esq. #3974 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON, P.C. 
1 Utah Center, Suite 1300 
201 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
MARSHA A. OSTRER, Esq. 
OSTRER & ASSOCIATES 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
Telephone (301) 593-9083 
Attorneys for Defendant David Melvin 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 16,1999,1 have served two copies of the Brief for 
the Appellant upon counsel for the Appellee, Steven Bednar, Manning Curtis 
Bradshaw and Bednar LLC, Newhouse Building, 3rd Floor, 10 Exchange Place, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 by first class mail, postage prepaid. 
Marsha A. Ostrer, Esq. 
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Franklin Covey Client Sales, No. 981850 
Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Melvin, an individual, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
The court defers ruling on plaintiff's motion for 
summary disposition until plenary hearing on the matter. The 
parties are asked to include the jurisdictional issue in their 
briefs. Rule 10(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is 
suspended; the parties should proceed to the next stage of the 
appellate process. 
BY THE COURT: 
Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
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1. My name is David Melvin I ani a citizen of the United Kingdom and a resident 
of the State of Maryland. I know the facts stated in this declaration from personal 
knowledge. I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify to the matters 
contained in this declaration. 
2 j j i a v e received permaitent work authorization from the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (hereinafter INS) to work in the U.S. I am married to a l : 
citizen who is a resident of Maryland and has been so for at least the last 15 years. ' r 
wife has two children who reside with iis whom I plan to adopt. 
3 I
 w a s employed by Franklin Covey Company for a period of 5 years and 9 
months. For 3 years and 6 months I worked for the company in the U.K. as Manager of 
Business Operations. My duties included: 
a Developing new business ii it the Unit jngdom iiiinl i uinpt ii'i iiiiiii in mint 
executive. 
Maintaining existing customer accounts. 
Presenting time and project management workshops to our customers. 
Developing, implementing and overseeing business and employee policies 
and procedures, 
e. Supervising and managing 18 ei i lployees and managing a $3 5 million 
business. 
4 11 i 1995 I applied for ai i intra-company transfer to the Shipley Division of 
Franklin Covey in the U.S. as I had become engaged to my current wife. I commenced 
work with Shipley Associates on July 5, 1995. My place of employment then, and at all 
times I was employed by Franklin Covey, was located at 200 Orchard Ridge Drive, Suite 
210, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878. When I first came to the U.S., Franklin Covey, was 
knowii as Franklin Quest Co Franklin Covey sponsored my application for immigration 
papers with the INS. In that application Franklin Covey acknowledged that I would be 
based in the Gaithersburg Office. 
5. I was employed by Frai lklin Covey in the U S between July 1995 and September 
1997. During that time I was given responsibility for sales in the Central Atlantic States 
in the Eastern Region. This territory was composed of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia. In addition 
to me, there were five other employees in the Gaithersburg office. These included two 
administrative assistants, Ann Coulis and Christine Smith, and three other account 
executives, Bob Cuneus, Frank Howard and Matt King. For the first year, my direct 
supervisor was Brad Douglas who was located in Utah and later my supervisor was Matt 
King who at all relevant times resided in Gaithersburg, Maryland. My duties for the 
Eastern Region were as follows: Strategic Business Communications Account Manager 
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in the Eastern United States and Europe selling writing and presentation training and 
consulting services. 
6. I have never resided in the State of Utah. I have no bank account or other 
financial ties of any kind to Utah. I own no property in Utah, pay no taxes and have no 
other connection to the state other than that I was employed by Franklin Covey. I have 
visited the State of Utah 10 times at the request of Franklin Covey. The dates of these 
visits and their purposes are as follows: 
April 20, 1992 10 days 
October 12, 1992 4 days 
July 2, 1993 4 days 
June 22, 1994 4 days 
January 2, 1995 2 days 
August 21, 1995 4 days 
January 2, 1996 4 days 
September 11, 1996 3 days 
November 25, 1996 2 days 
May 30, 1997 1 day 
Induction training 
Conference 
Conference 
Conference 
Job interviews 
Conference 
Conference 
Sales retreat 
Program training 
Meeting with GEC U.K. 
7. Most of these were meetings for sales representatives from around the world 
whom Franklin Covey invited to Salt Lake City for meetings. While in Utah I conducted 
no business other than that related to the meetings I attended. I have no clients who are 
based in Utah. The only exception to the above was a meeting I attended in May of 
1997 for the purpose of assisting Franklin Covey in understanding the needs of an 
existing U.K. client, known as GEC. Since I knew GEC when I worked in the U.K., I 
was asked by Franklin to help Franklin's sales staff in Utah understand GECs needs. 
Franklin Covey requested that I attend. I did not attempt to sell products or services to 
GEC in Utah. I did not receive any compensation for this trip (although my only 
compensation at that time was a straight commission) and no sale resulted in Utah at the 
time. I understand that later sales took place in the U.K.. The only other time I was 
scheduled to attend a business meeting in Utah was on August 20, 1997 when I was 
about to board an airplane to Utah, but was fired by telephone at the airport. It was 
never my intention to subject myself to the laws of Utah nor to seek the protection of 
Utah law. 
8. All acts pertinent to this complaint occurred in and around the State of Maryland. 
(All of the states in my territory border Maryland, except for New Jersey, which is 
separated from Maryland by less then 20 miles.) I have signed no contractual document 
with Franklin Covey or any related entity agreeing to the application of the laws of the 
State of Utah in any case or controversy relating to my employment. 
9. Should this case go to trial, the following categories of witnesses are likely to 
testify: 
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a. Employees of Franklin Covey located in and around Maryland, lo the 
best of my knowledge Franklin Covey employs 10 account executives and 
10 training consultants residing in and around the Maryland area for the 
Eastern Region. 
b. 1 oirnei employees ot Franklin Covey, lo the best ot my knowledge there 
aie approximately six former Franklin Covey employees with knowledge of 
matters pertinent hereto and who live in and around the Maryland area. 
c. Former clients of mine who purchased and/or continue to purchase services 
and products from Franklin Covey. See attached Exhibit A. The 
breakdown for these companies is as follows: 
10 in Maryland 
14 in Virginia 
1 in West Virginia 
5 in DC 
I in Delaware 
20 in Pennsylvania 
20 in New Jersey 
1 in New York 
3 in Europe 
10 Except foi (he European clients, all of the clients are within a few hours drive of 
Maryland. The costs of obtaining willing witnesses to testify would be much greater if 
this matter is heard in Utah 
11. Most ot (lit souiees ot proof are in Maryland. 1 conducted business (when not 
visiting clients on site) either at the Gaithersburg office or at my home in Silver Spring, 
Maryland. Additionally, Franklin Covey does considerable business in the State ot 
Maryland. Franklin Covey also maintains a client contact management system which 
record all client contacts This system, is available from any computer with a modem. 
12. Until 1998, when I received my W-2 form ioi 1997 and was served with the 
summons in this ease, I had no idea that I might have been working for Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc since none of my employment related documents used that name 
13. I he sponsoring organization on my INS application was originally Franklin Qutsl 
Company and later Franklin Covey Consulting Group. Based on documents in my 
possession and personnel documents previously requested by me from Franklin Covey, at 
no time did I enter into any relationship, contractual or otherwise, with Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Tnc 
14. Franklin Covey operates a le ta i l inn Ih it sells SIIJIJIIM mil illh i 1 ihiiil lin I 
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materials in Towson, Maryland and has operated this store during the entire period of 
time I worked for Franklin Covey in America. Additional retail stores are operated in 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia and the District of Columbia. 
15. On or about February 5, 1998, my Maryland attorney sent a negotiation letter to 
Franklin Covey Co.. A copy of that letter is attached to this declaration (without its own 
attachments) as Exhibit B. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Date: Afof &* ftpf 
David Melvin 
dm^ 
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David Melvin 
Supplemental Declaration 
My name is David Melvin. I am 54 years old. I am a resident of Maryland. I am 
married to an American citizen who has two children, a 13 year old boy with 
profound learning disabilities and a 2 year old baby that I am adopting. We have 
been a family for the past 3 years. 
I joined Franklin International, Europe, a division of Franklin International Institute, 
Inc. in Europe in January 1992 as an Account Executive (AE) and training consultant 
based in the United Kingdom (UK). Between January, 1992 and July,1995 I 
continued to be employed by Franklin International, Europe in the UK. During that 
time I was consistently overall number one for productivity. In January, 1995, I 
applied for a transfer to the United States, where Franklin Quest Co. (when Franklin 
went public it changed its name to Franklin Quest Co. Franklin Quest Co. is the 
direct forerunner of Franklin Covey Co.) is incorporated and has its principal place 
of business. I was offered the position of AE for the Central Atlantic States with a 
division of Franklin Quest Co. known as Shipley Associates, a Division of Franklin 
Quest Co. 
I signed a letter of agreement on May 9, 1995 with Shipley Associates. This letter set 
forth the terms of my employment. This letter contains no reference to what laws 
would apply if a conflict arose between my employer and myself nor did it contain any 
provision regarding timing and payment of commissions for sales of services and 
goods. 
I started in work in the U.S. in Maryland in July, 1995. My supervisor at that time 
was Jeff Call. Mr. Call or someone else from the home office in Utah would often 
visit the Maryland office. All of my activities were directed at developing business 
within my territory, the Central Atlantic States. At that time my employer maintained 
an office at 200 Orchard Ridge Drive, Gaithersburg, Maryland that contained office 
space for AE's and two administrative assistants. I either worked out of that office or 
at home where I maintained a separate office business phone line, or traveled to visit 
clients within the Central Atlantic States (which I did on a regular basis.) Christine 
Smith, who was the administrative assistant in the Maryland office and is a resident of 
Maryland (and would testify at trial in Maryland if called) was my primary support 
and provided administrative and clerical support to my work in the Central Atlantic 
States. The other administrative assistant, Ann Coulis, also a resident of Maryland, 
also has knowledge of my activities. 
It should be noted that at the time that I assumed my actual duties in the U.S., I was 
informed that my employer had arbitrarily cut back on the territory for which I would 
be responsible, therefore cutting back my income potential. I estimate the total 
existing business taken from me at that time to have had a value of at least $300,000 
per annum. Despite all of this I achieved a 68% growth in sales from S227K in 1995 
to S382K in 1996. This was my first experience with Franklin Covey Co. going back 
on a promise that they had made to me to their advantage and my disadvantage. 
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I had no formal performance appraisal at the end of fiscal 1995 or 1996 but received 
warm tributes from my then immediate supervisor, Brad Douglas, in Utah, and the 
then leader of the division, John Harding for my sales performance, for the skill I 
applied teaming with other AE's and for working with their clients to improve overall 
sales for Franklin Quest in 1994. When I inquired about a formal, on the record 
performance appraisal, Brad Douglas informed me that this did not happen here in 
the U.S. 
My team was reorganized at the start of fiscal 1997 into area teams in the division 
rather than product in different parts of the country. The three product teams were: 
Strategic Business Communications, (SBC), Business Development Services, (BDS), 
and Projects. I was part of the SBC group and had line responsibility for the Eastern 
area. My immediate supervisor was Matt King, who lived and worked in Maryland. 
At the start of fiscal 1997, I was given a non-negotiable goal of $650 K for fiscal 1997 
which represented a 41% increase over fiscal 1996 actual sales. This was the largest 
increase in my product group even though I had the least tenure. This was my second 
experience of arbitrary behavior on the part of my employer that benefited the 
employer and hurt me. 
In fiscal 1997 I was given little support for the projects part of the business which 
represented 50% of my goal. This particular part of the business required support 
from another branch of the business. This project goal was a joint one. The person 
assigned to me (Steve Hilton) in 1997 was inexperienced and unmotivated. He 
subsequently left the company but only after he had done our mutual sales goal grave 
damage. I brought this to the attention of Matt King who agreed but indicated that 
he was helpless to do anything about it. 
I raised this issue again with Matt King at our November 1996 strategy meeting,(my 
over-riding concern was Hilton's availability, he did not respond to voice messages, 
and was evasive about coming East to work together.). King agreed and said he was 
having problems supervising him and he thought Hilton was trying to breakaway from 
his supervision. Again he said he had complained to upper management, but nothing 
was being done. Matt King became sick at this time and was out of action for the 
remainder of the 1997 fiscal year. So I was lacking management direct support. 
Finally, in desperation, I formally brought the problem to the attention of Jeff 
Shumway, the Vice President responsible for sales for the Eastern Region at our 
regional conference at the beginning of December 1996 held in Gaithersburg, 
Maryland, to be told that, whilst it was a problem, we would just have to figure out a 
way of dealing with it ourselves. (Other AE's applauded me for this stance saying it 
was long overdue.) The problem was never resolved and Hilton found another job 
elsewhere in March 1997. By this time all of senior management were being 
consumed by the merger with Covey and no replacement was made. 
On April 1, 1997, I went to the office as was my practice. I was expecting to have a 
meeting with Jeff Butler, a Franklin Quest Co. Vice President who was visiting the 
Maryland office from Utah. I had been told that the purpose of the meeting was a 
strategy meeting to discuss third quarter activities and business forecast and had 
prepared accordingly. I was stunned when informed by Mr. Butler, upon my arrival at 
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9 a.m. that my position was being eliminated with immediate effect. I was told I was 
expected to leave the office that week and turn over all files, and, keys and credit 
cards. I was given a letter (on Franklin Quest Co. letterhead) to sign stating that 
Franklin Quest Co. would pay me approximately six weeks compensation (pre-tax) in 
return for waiving any and all legal rights I had in the matter. This was my third 
experience with arbitrary and capricious behavior on the part of my employer that 
benefited my employer to my detriment. Needless to say, I refused to sign and waive 
any of my rights or any of Franklin Quest Co.'s liability. I was told by Jeff Butler that 
he had been told to "fix the East" and "cut heads" because of the approaching merger 
with Covey. Jeff Butler went on to say that this decision was a tragedy because of the 
effort that I had made without a manager, without a project partner and because of 
the business developed in the previous quarter for the future. He was visibly relieved 
when I asked if there was anyway this decision could be reversed. 
12. I was astounded because in the three months prior to this event, I had received 
constant affirmations from Jeff Shumway that I was a "class act" and that when the 
merger was completed there would be space for everyone currently working for both 
Franklin and Covey in the new organization - i.e. no firings were intended. 
13. I asked if the decision to eliminate my position was negotiable and was told that it 
was. I immediately contacted Jeff Shumway and he told me that he had heard that I 
wished to negotiate and said, yet again, that I was a "first class act" and that he 
looked forward to receiving my proposal to remain with Franklin Quest Co. 
14. For the next several days, I worked hard on a straight commission proposal that 
would have left me whole and left the company without risk if I did not perform. I 
negotiated in good faith for a week fully expecting that Jeff Shumway would stand by 
his commitment to "keep me whole" until the new organization was in place in 
September, 1997, after which time I could return to my former status and be 
rewarded in exactly the same way as all other client partners( the new title for AEs). 
15. I proposed to Franklin Quest Co. that I be paid on a commission basis only and for it 
to be set around the average commissions paid to others in the organization (between 
15% & 20%). Franklin Quest Co. refused and their final offer was a commission rate 
of 9% of sales after some fixed costs, an equivalent rate of 6.3%. I had no alternative 
but to accept. This was effectively a cutting of my income by 60%. I, to this day, fail 
to understand why Franklin Quest Co. did not accept my initial proposal since it 
provided for no risk to them but rewarded me adequately if I performed as usual. 
This was my fourth experience with Franklin Quest Co.'s arbitrary and capricious 
behavior that benefited the company to my detriment. Franklin Quest Co. knew 
that I could not obtain work elsewhere in the U.S. immediately, as my work permit 
only allowed me to work for them. Therefore, I accepted their non negotiable offer. 
16. Once again Jeff Shumway assured me that he held me in "high regard professionally" 
and continued to refer to me as a "class act." Others in the company told me that 
everyone "marveled" at how I had handled the situation and that I could expect 
different treatment in the future as a result. Even during the week I was temporarily 
unemployed, I continued to serve my clients in a demonstration of my good faith. 
Mr. Shumway again assured me that I would be "made whole" again when the merger 
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with the Covey Co. was completed in September, apologized for the whole affair and 
expressed his hopes that I would continue to be a part of the team. 
17. The new arrangement imposed extreme hardships on my family and me. My income 
had been cut by 60% with no notice and no time to plan for this outcome. This 
produced both financial hardship and emotional distress. 
18. From April 8th 1997 until September 12th 1997 I fully participated in business 
development both as an individual and as a team member supporting my colleagues in 
their business endeavors. This has always been my modus operandi as many of my 
former colleagues will attest and has been the hallmark of the success of every team 
with whom I have been involved. It was exciting for me to learn, during this period, 
that future compensations would reflect much more of the collegiate and client 
relationship efforts than in the past. It was also exciting for me to learn that there 
would be no reduction in headcount as a result of the merger. I met and exceeded my 
training income goals during this time and began to make inroads into the project 
goals set for the year. 
19. Although I was being compensated on unadvantageous commission I willingly 
participated in events for the greater good of the company, acting in good faith as a 
part of my investment for the future and truly believing that Franklin Quest Co. was 
operating in good faith. One example of this was my business relationship with GEC. 
Since 1995 I had been developing this from my Maryland office with the U.S. 
subsidiary of this UK company based in New Jersey. GEC has businesses located 
throughout the Americas. GEC was a former client of mine in the UK. Early in 1997 
the director of training for GEC worldwide asked the U.S. subsidiary to set up 
meetings with training vendors in the U.S. who had the capability to design and 
deliver GEC based training programs . My contact approached me to set up meetings 
with senior Franklin people in Utah and stressed the magnitude of business potential 
worldwide for Franklin. This I did acting as liaison and agenda developer between the 
director of training in the UK and senior management in Utah. While it was not 
among the duties I was assigned I undertook it because I believed that everyone in 
Franklin would benefit substantially. 
20. Three weeks before the meeting date I was asked by Jeff Butler to fly to Utah for the 
meeting to act as host and resolve any cross cultural issues. No compensation was 
offered for this trip or these services. I agreed believing, as I was led to believe by 
Franklin Quest Co. management, that after this temporary setback, I would be made 
whole. No contracts were entered into during this meeting nor orders placed nor 
money changed hands and the outcome was an opportunity for Franklin to submit a 
business proposal to GEC. 
21. I attended a regional conference in Boston at the beginning of August. At this 
conference I was assigned my new role as client partner and met with colleagues who 
would be members of the same team based in Washington D.C. There we began the 
process of working together to assign territories and clients. Compensation plans had 
not been finalized and once again I was assured by Jeff Shumway that I would be 
compensated in the same way as all the others; we would share a pool of salary and 
commission in a graded structure based on past performance with the company in the 
areas of income goals, team relationships, and client development. Territories and 
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clients were not resolved at the conference and we continued to work on these as a 
team the following week in D.C. 
We were scheduled to come together as the new Franklin Covey Co. sales 
organization in Utah on August the 20th. when the final compensation plans and 
assigned territories would be agreed. Since I had not heard about compensation I 
asked Mr. Shumway and others. I was continually assured that I would receive the 
same compensation package as all other sales employees. I left Maryland for a 
vacation with my family the second week of August but remained in daily contact with 
my colleagues in Maryland as we continued to discuss territories and clients. I had 
been personally invited by Kevin Cope, the Senior Vice President of Sales to attend 
the sales conference in Utah the week of August 18, 1997. Accordingly, my family 
and I planned that I would be in Utah at that time. 
In addition, I was asked to participate in a panel discussion presentation at the Utah 
meeting. I was told it was due to my depth of knowledge, and my experience in cross 
selling the vast range of company products and services. During my vacation I spent 
considerable time readying my presentation and discussing it with other colleagues 
who would be participating. 
On August 20th I left my vacation home very early in the morning and was driven by 
my wife and children to a commuter bus stop. The trip to the airport was a two hour 
trip by bus. I arrived at the airport, checked my bags for the flight and prior to 
boarding checked my voice mail one more time. There was a message from Mr. 
Shumway asking me to call him before I boarded the plane. I complied and was told 
by Mr. Shumway not to come to Utah. That I was to be fired again. Upper 
management had decided to ait headcount. He went on to say that he was engrossed 
with the sales conference and would get back to me in a couple of days. At that 
point I had to break contact with Mr. Shumway in order to get my luggage that was 
already loaded onto the airplane. I heard nothing further from Mr. Shumway. 
I initiated contact with Mr. Shumway on August 25th by faxing a letter to him asking 
for an explanation. Despite ail of the uncertainty I continued to serve my clients and 
support colleagues and informed Mr. Shumway of this fact in my letter. Mr. 
Shumway left a variety of messages on my answering machine that seemed to indicate 
that I had been terminated because of "headcount" although at other times he 
contradicted himself. (This was further complicated by the fact that when I finally 
obtained a copy of my personnel file from Franklin Covey Co. the information in the 
file indicated that I had resigned rather than been terminated.) 
I received a phone call at my home in Maryland from Joyce Smith from Franklin 
Covey Co. on Monday, September 15th, 1997 confirming that my employment was 
terminated as of September 12th, 1997. There were no arrangements or suggestions 
of arrangements for compensating for the time I had spent in August and September. 
Thirteen days after I sent him a letter Mr. Shumway called and left me a message 
which did nothing to clarify things. There followed a time during which I continually 
received calls from Mr. Shumway and from Jim Goodro, the person in Utah who had 
been assigned my accounts for information concerning those accounts. Since I was no 
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longer a Franklin Covey Co. employee and worked on straight commission I 
requested compensation for any efforts Franklin Covey Co. wanted me to expend and 
for the time wasted in traveling to the airport and back in August. Mr. Shumway 
refused and accused me of betraying "our friendship." 
At that point I consulted my attorney in Maryland. Franklin Covey Co. was informed 
of this and asked to deal with my attorney directly. Still calls came to me from Mr. 
Shumway until I left him a message directing him to direct all further calls to my 
attorney. After prolonged negotiations, I finally received a copy of my personnel file, 
which contained several inaccuracies, and compensation allegedly for commissions 
earned by me up to including September 12, 1997. (Even the personnel file came 
with a cover letter on Franklin Covey Co. letterhead.) In return for the check (from 
Franklin Covey Co.) I signed a released which is attached to the plaintiffs motion as 
Attachment B. This release was carefully drafted to ensure that I waived none of my 
rights except as to the compensation being paid. Franklin Covey Co. withheld sending 
me the monies until they received the signed release. Evidently they found it 
acceptable at that time because they did send the check. 
When I entered into the new employment contract with Franklin Covey Co. in April, 
1997 it did contain the sentence "according to Franklin policy, commissions are paid 
only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin." My 
interpretation at the time I signed (which remains the same today) was that Franklin 
Covey Co. would act in good faith and not fire me in bad faith. Then, if I chose to 
leave Franklin Covey Co. voluntarily I would forfeit my right to receive further 
commissions. I knew of no cases where Franklin Covey Co. had fired employees in 
the past and believed that the only likely scenario was voluntary departure and parting 
of the ways. I never dreamt that I would be led on to produce as much revenue for 
Franklin Covey Co. as possible within the confines of the April, 1997, agreement and 
then summarily fired in bad faith before I could collect for my effort and hard work. 
Franklin Covey Co. did not pay me all of the compensation that it admitted I was due 
when I was terminated. It was necessary for me to engage an attorney to try to get 
the money that Franklin Covey Co. owed me for sales that were completed before I 
left. I chose to negotiate the matter of other commissions separately because I 
desparately needed that money and Franklin Covey Co. had shown its willingness to 
violate Maryland law, which requires an employer to pay final compensation promptly. 
Given the hard time we had collecting the monies due me up to September 12, 1997, 
it was clear that Franklin Covey Co. was not willing to do the right thing by me. I 
asked my attorney to file suit for the additional compensation. Up to that point any 
request for compensation by me, for the wasted day in Boston for example, had been 
ignored by Franklin Covey Co. Accordingly my attorney in Maryland drafted a 
complaint and informed me that it was his practice to encourage negotiation instead 
of litigation. Therefore, he suggested we send the complaint with a letter to Franklin 
Covey Co. first and see if matters could be worked out. My attorney sent the letter 
on February 5, 1998. We heard no response of any kind from anyone at Franklin 
Covey Co. On Saturday February 14, 1998, I was at my home giving a bottle to our 
infant son in preparation for his nap. The doorbell rang and I went to answer it 
because both my wife and older son were upstairs and could not hear it. At the door 
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was a stranger who demanded to know if I was David Melvin. He held up a card 
which I could not read and put it immediately back into his pocket. I confirmed that I 
was David Melvin and asked him his business. Once again he flashed his card at me, 
produced a set of papers,, made a notation on them as to the time and date , handed 
them to me and left. His manner was decidedly hostile. The contents turned out to 
be a summons to answer to a case filed in Utah state court by a company called 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, a company with whom I have had no dealings. I 
understand that I could have received this summons by mail, return receipt requested, 
or some other method and believe that the plaintiff chose this method as it would 
produce the maximum amount of intimidation potential. 
32. The attached documents are true and accurate copies of documents referenced in this 
supplemental declaration and elsewhere. Among other things, they establish that my 
dealings were with Franklin Covey Co. and that I never entered into an employment 
relationship with Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.. 
I declare under penalties of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Date: 
David Melvin 
fi«flw_ 
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370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 2 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
801 363-5678 
FAX 801 364-5678 
STEVEN C BEDNAR 
SBEDNAR@MC2B COM 
June 30, 1998 
Via Facsimile and U.S. Mail 
(301) 593-2987 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
Re: Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. David Melvin 
Civil No. 980901616MI 
Dear Mr. Melvin: 
I have enclosed an original of the written Order containing the rulings made by Judge 
Young on June 26, 1998. These have been prepared at Judge Young's instruction. Pursuant to 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, you have five days to sign this Order 
and return it to me or to submit your objections. 
Very truly yours, 
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Attorneys for Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
and Franklin Covey Co. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC 
A T T O R N E Y S - A T ' L A W 
Enclosure 
cc: Mark Hessel (w/encs.) 
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 980901616 MI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant David Melvin's Motion(s) to Dismiss and Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court on July 26, 1998. Steven C. 
Bednar appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and on behalf of 
Franklin Covey Co.1 Defendant David Melvin did not appear at the hearing. The Court 
franklin Covey Co. is not a named party to this action but has previously filed a pleading entitled Consent 
to Be Bound By Judgment and Assignment. 
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announced the rulings set forth in this Order based upon the Memoranda submitted by the parties 
and without oral argument. 
The Court, having read briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties and the 
accompanying attachments and having considered the relevant authorities, hereby orders as 
follows: Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED.2 With respect to Plaintiff 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.fs Motion for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues 
of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED. 
DATED this day of , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
David S. Young 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
David Melvin 
2Defendant David Melvin filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue while this 
action was pending in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Defendant also filed a Motion to 
Dismiss after remand to this Court. Both Motions assert a lack of personal jurisdiction which the Court finds 
unmeritorious. The Alterative Motion to Transfer Venue raised in Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss became 
moot upon remand. Other arguments raised in Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are subsumed in this Court's 
ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be sent, 
via facsimile and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid this day of June, 1998 to the following: 
Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
Suite 307 
11501 Georgia Avenue 
Wheaton, MD 20902 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC 
A I F O R N E I S A 1 L A W 3 7 0 EAST SOUTH TEMPI E 
SUITE 2 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, U 1 841II 
801 363-5678 
FAX SOI 364-5678 
STEVEN C. BEDNAR 
SBEDNAR@MC2B.COM 
July 10, 1998 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
R e: l <kith i t , • n 
No. 98u^u 
Dear \ Ir. Melvin: 
I enclose mi ; our review and approval as to form a Declaratory Judgment in the above-
referenced matter. This is furnished to you pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Very truly yours, 
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar 
Attorneys for Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
and Franklin Covey Co. 
Enclosure 
cci Mark L. Hessel, Esq. 
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
& BEDNAR, LLC 
Steven C. Bednar #5660 
Candice Anderson #7456 
370 East South Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID MELVIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980901616 MI 
Judge David S. Young 
The Court hereby enters judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a "person interested" under the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. Plaintiff is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. Franklin Covey Co. has consented to be bound by the 
Judgment filed in this action to the same extent as Plaintiff. This Declaratory Judgment is 
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(hereinafter "Franklin Covey,")1 
0
 The Court hereby declares the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of 
Franklin Covey and Defendai it 1\ fel i in at ising fi: oiii Defendant Melvii 
Franklin Covey as follows. 11 > Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to 
pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation related to seminars held or future 
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to the September 12, 1997 effective 
date of Defendant Melvin's separation from Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant 
hikh in inn No\ ciiilii i I 'i, I 'J1*1 I i. u ii all iLiiiiis n hi led to pa\. .--u ompensation oi 
commissions for services performed by Melvin durn«: H»s employment with Franklin; and {[•) 
Frank lin'<- polic\ and practice v\ ith respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account 
j . Hie parties shall each bear their own costs and attorneys1 fees in this action. 
DATED this day of July, 1998. 
B\ THE COUR I : 
David S. Young 
Third District Court Judge 
The Court acknowledges that Defendant Melvin contends that his actual employer was Franklin Covey 
Co. and not Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. However, the Court finds that it is immaterial whether Defendant 
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. This action concerns only one 
employee, one employer, and only one employment relationship. The relevant terms of Defendant Melvin's 
employment relationship are established by an undisputed compensation agreement under which the rights, status, 
and legal relations of the parties are hereby determined. 
m e t uurt finds that the declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both I Jtah and I\ laryland 
law. The Court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Melvin 
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I hereby certify that i CdUM-u I true and v orrcct cop\ • >i ihu foregoing DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT to be sent, via facsimile and 1' S Mail, postagt prepaid t h i s y ^ ^ day of July, 1998 
to the following: 
* << \ 1 . 1 K ISM M 
Mi:ie 307 
1 1 ^01 Georgia Avenue 
M:) 2CW02 
20901 
v_ 
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